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T

he Akimel O’odham (Pima) Indians and their
ancestors, the HuHuGum, practiced irrigated
agriculture in central Arizona for over two
thousand years. In the late 1700s, the Peeposh
(Maricopa) Indians formed a political, economic, and
military confederation with the O’odham. The PimaMaricopa Confederation was affluent before the
arrival of Euro-Americans. Following their arrival,
the Euro-Americans diverted the Gila and Salt
Rivers, which deprived the Confederation of water
it needed to sustain its agriculture. Consequently,
the members of the Confederation were reduced
to poverty, malnutrition, and endemic diabetes.
The economic basis of Pimas and Maricopas were
effectively destroyed by the illegal diversions.
The restoration of water to Pimas and Maricopas
is unparalleled in the history of Native Americans in
the United States and is especially dramatic in the arid
Southwest. The determination, tenacity, and patience
of Pimas and Maricopas in litigation and negotiations
caused this amazing turn of events to occur.
The Gila River Indian Reservation was established
for the Pimas and Maricopas in 1859 and expanded
seven times between 1876 and 1915. The Gila
River Indian Community has battled for many
decades to regain part of the water that was once
theirs in order to reacquire economic independence
and return to their agrarian lifestyle. The most
recent of the Community’s battles to regain its lost
water is the General Adjudication of All Rights to
Use Water in the Gila River System and Source
(Gila River Adjudication), first filed in 1974. The
Winters federally reserved water rights doctrine is
an important component of the Community’s legal
efforts. The Community has followed a dual path
of assertive litigation and arduous negotiation in its
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endeavors to reclaim its water. It has successfully
prevailed in many of the treacherous shoals of
water rights litigation and is close to entering the
safe harbor of a complete settlement of its water
rights claims.
We will discuss the history of the Gila River
Indian Community’s impending water rights
settlement and outline the steps that remain in
bringing this long and tortured process to fruition.
In order to understand the backdrop against which
negotiations were conducted, it is important to
discuss Arizona water law and the Winters doctrine
and then examine the procedures that have taken
place to date in the Gila River Adjudication.

Arizona Water Law
Mark Twain explained that “Whisky is for drinking
— Water is for fighting.” The problem with water in
the arid western part of the United States is that there
just isn’t enough of it. “ The essence of western water
law is that water, not land, is the scarce resource.”1
In the State of Arizona, water is public property and
private parties may only own the right to use the
water.2 Private parties acquire the right to use water
through the prior appropriation doctrine.3
The essence of prior appropriation is “first in time
is first in right,” that is, the person first appropriating
the water has the better right. A senior appropriator
has the right to take all of its “diversion undiminished
in quantity and quality” before a junior appropriator
can take any water.4 The water appropriated must be
put to a beneficial use.5 Such beneficial uses include:
domestic, municipal, irrigation, stock watering,
water power, recreation, wildlife, nonrecoverable
water storage, and mining.6
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Eastern states, where water shortages are less
frequent, use the riparian doctrine to allocate the use
of water between conflicting claimants. Simply put,
a party who owns land adjoining a water source may
make reasonable use of that water, so long as the
use does not injure a downstream party or interfere
with a downstream riparian owner’s use of water.
Under the riparian doctrine, if there is an occasional
shortage of water, the users share the shortage pro
rata. As a territory, Arizona unequivocally rejected
the riparian doctrine.7 With the adoption of its
constitution, and embracing prior appropriation, the
State of Arizona declared that “[t]he common law
doctrine of riparian water rights shall not obtain or
be of any force or effect in the State.”8
Arizona’s version of the prior appropriation
doctrine has one unusual notion. In most prior
appropriation states, the doctrine applies to both
surface and underground water. As law professor
Robert Glennon discusses elsewhere in this issue,
Arizona has a divided system in which some
underground water is appropriable and other
underground water is not. While this split system
was recognized early in Arizona’s judicial history,
its first “clear” definition was provided in Maricopa
County Municipal Water Conservation District
v. Southwest Cotton Co. 9 Underground water
considered to be so closely related to the surface
flow as to be a part of the stream is called “subflow”
and is subject to prior appropriation. Underground
water considered not to be closely related to the
surface flow is called “percolating water” and is
not subject to prior appropriation. The obvious
question is: How do you tell the different types
of underground water apart? The test stated in
Southwest Cotton was:
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Because percolating water is not subject to prior
appropriation, Smith cannot prevent Jones from
taking percolating water from beneath Jones’ land,
even though that taking prevents Smith from using
his water. The limit to the right to capture and use
percolating water is that the water must be used for
a beneficial purpose on the land from which it is
drawn.12 Like appropriable water, percolating water
is not subject to private ownership and “the right
of the owner of the overlying land is simply to the
usufruct of the water.”13

Winters Federally Reserved Water
Rights Doctrine

Does drawing off the subsurface water tend
to diminish appreciably and directly the flow
of the surface stream? If it does, it is subflow,
and subject to the same rules of appropriation
as the surface stream itself; if it does not, then,
although it may originally come from the waters
of such stream, it is not, strictly speaking, a part
thereof, but is subject to the rules applying to
percolating waters.10

For a wide variety of legal, political, and economic
reasons, the prior appropriation doctrine has generally
been of limited benefit to Indian tribes in their efforts
to protect their rights to use water. In contrast, the
Winters federally reserved water rights doctrine has
become an extremely important tool in Indian water
rights litigation. The Winters doctrine arose from
Winters v. United States,14 which was an effort by the
United States to quantify and protect the water rights
of the Fort Belknap Indian Reservation.
The United States created the Fort Belknap Indian
Reservation, in Montana, to serve as a permanent home
and abiding place for Gros Ventre and Assiniboine
Indians. The Milk River runs through the reservation.
After the reservation was created, but before the
United States filed suit to protect the Indians’ rights to
use water, numerous non-Indian settlers appropriated
the use of virtually all the water. If the water rights
of the reservation were limited to prior appropriation
rights, the Gros Ventre and Assiniboine Indians would
have been left high and dry.
The United States Supreme Court noted that
the Indians had occupied and used a much larger
area than the reservation, and that this wider area
had been adequate to support them in a nomadic
lifestyle. The Court was aware of the federal policy
compelling Indians to exchange a pastoral lifestyle
and that, on the arid lands of the reservation, this
could be accomplished through irrigated agriculture.
The Supreme Court concluded:

Early on, Arizona courts recognized that a
distinction between subflow and percolating waters
“completely overlook[ed] the hydrological cycle.”11

The power of the government to reserve the
waters and exempt them from appropriation
under the state laws is not denied, and could
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not be. That the government did reserve them
we have decided, and for a use which would be
necessarily continued through the years.15

The Winters doctrine16 is different from, but
interrelated with, the prior appropriation doctrine.
The quantity and priority of Winters water rights
are determined under different rules than the
quantity and priority of prior appropriation water
rights. Indian and other federal reservations and
non-federal parties, however, almost always take
their water from common sources. Once the rights
are established, under their respective rules, they
are administered together. The following are the
important facts that are unique to Winters rights .
(1) “Reserved rights are ‘federal water rights’
and ‘are not dependent upon state law or state
procedures.’ . . . This merely reflects the tension
between the doctrines of prior appropriation and
Indian reserved rights. When reserved rights are
properly implied, they arise without regard to
equities that may favor competing water users.”17
(2) Prior appropriation rights are always a matter
of express intent. “[A]ppropriation is the intent to
take [water], accompanied by some open, physical
demonstration of the intent, and for some valuable
use.”18 Winters rights are implied. There does not
need to be any express intention to reserve water
contained in the statute or executive order creating
the Indian reservation. Reservation of water rights
is implied through the creation or expansion of an
Indian reservation.19
(3) While the date of a right under prior
appropriation is the date upon which the water was
first put to beneficial use, the date of a right under
the Winters doctrine is the date on which the Indian
reservation was created or expanded. If a prior
appropriation right existed prior to the date of the
creation of the reservation, it is senior to the Winters
right. If a prior appropriation right did not come
into existence until after the date of the creation of
the reservation, it is junior to the Winters right, even
if the date and amount of the Winters right was not
actually quantified until many years later.20 The
Winters right comes into existence as of the date of
the creation of the Indian reservation, without the
necessity of diversion or beneficial use.21
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(4) Prior appropriation water rights can be lost if
they are not used for a specified period of time (five
years in Arizona).22 Winters rights are not lost by
non-use, prior to or following their quantification
by a competent court. “The reserved rights are
open ended and do not depend on actual use to be
maintained. Water is therefore available whenever
needed to fulfill the purposes of the reservation.”23
“Therefore, reserved water rights are not lost by
latches, estoppel or adverse possession.”24
(5) The quantity of a prior appropriation water
right is measured by the amount of water that was
initially put to beneficial use. If Jones started using
60 acre-feet of water on ten acres of land in 1910,
she would have a right to use 60 acre-feet with a
1910 priority. She would have the right to take
her full 60 acre-feet before an appropriator with a
1911 priority could take any water. However, she
would not be allowed to take 70 acre-feet unless she
acquired a priority right (with a new priority date)
for the additional ten acre-feet.
The amount of water reserved for an Indian
reservation is the amount needed “to satisfy the
future as well as the present needs of the Indian
Reservations.”25 Because an Indian reservation
is intended to be a permanent home and abiding
place for its Indian inhabitants, the amount of
water reserved cannot be based on present needs.
As the United States Supreme Court explained:
“How many Indians there will be and what their
future needs will be can only be guessed.”26 The
standard for quantification of water rights for Indian
reservations set by the Arizona v. California Court
was “enough water . . . to irrigate all the practicably
irrigable acreage on the reservation.”27

Gila River Adjudication
The filing of a petition in 1974, to adjudicate
water rights of the Salt River initiated the General
Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Gila
River System and Source. The case was expanded
to include the Upper Agua Fria, Upper Gila, Lower
Gila, and Upper Santa Cruz Rivers.28 This initiated
the most significant and decisive action with regard
to water rights in the history of Arizona. The Gila
River Adjudication court grappled with not only the
tens of thousands of non-Indian water rights claims,
Journal of Contemporary Water Research & Education
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but also began to weigh and adjudicate the water
rights of Indian tribes in Arizona. This far reaching
and comprehensive litigation will be remembered
as the critical pivotal point in the development of
water law in Arizona.
“Water litigation is a weed that flowers in the arid
West.”29 If Jones has a water right with a 1910 priority
and Smith has a water right with a 1923 priority,
Jones should be able to take all of her water before
Smith takes any of his water. A process needs to be
available for determining the quantity and priority
of each of their rights, and, thereafter, for enforcing
those quantified rights. From such needs, litigation
arises. “A water rights adjudication is a proceeding
to determine the respective priorities of water rights
on a stream system for purposes of administration.
[Citation omitted.] A decree does not confer, but
rather confirms a pre-existing water right.”30
Before the initiation of the Gila River
Adjudication, there were numerous local water
decrees quantifying the respective water rights of
water users along various isolated segments of the
Gila River and its tributaries. These prior decrees
included: Kent Decree, Haggard Decree; BensonAllison Decree; Ling Decree; Lockwood Decree;
Doan Decree; Jenkes Decree; Shute Decree;
San Pedro Decision; Clifford v. Larrieu; Hill v.
Lenerman; Dyke v. Caldwell; Miller v. Douglas;
Boquillas Land and Cattle Company v. Saint
David Cooperative Comm. and Dev. Association;
Wolf v. Turner; Pyeatt v. Huachuca Queen Mining
Company; Clarkson and Clarkson v. Wilcox; and
the Globe Equity Decree.
All of the waters of the Gila River system are
interconnected. Streams flow into the Black River
which joins the White River, to form the Salt
River, which is joined by the Verde River, which
then joins the Gila River. If a party with a 1993
prior appropriation right takes water out of the
Verde River, that user reduces the amount of water
that is available to fill the senior water rights of a
party taking Salt River water with a 1910 priority.
There are insurmountable problems with a series
of isolated water decrees. Without river system
administration, an upstream appropriator with a
1911 priority right (quantified by Boquillas Land
and Cattle Company v. Saint David Cooperative
Comm. and Dev. Association) can take water in
advance of a downstream appropriator with an
immemorial water right (quantified by the Globe
Journal of Contemporary Water Research & Education
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Equity Decree). Equally problematic is the fact that
massive numbers of water users in the Gila River
system have never had their water rights claims
adjudicated by any court.
There is only one process that can allow for a fair and
equitable allocation of the appropriable water of an entire
river system and source — a general adjudication.
A general adjudication is a court decree
which lists every appropriation of water in a
particular river basin. The decree states the
name of the appropriator, the date of the priority
of the water rights, the amount and purpose of
the appropriation, the place of diversion of the
water, the dates and times of the water use, and
the place of use.”31

The Arizona Supreme Court recognized the
necessity for a general adjudication:
The necessity of consolidation and expansion
of the proceedings is dictated by practical
considerations unrelated to and, in fact, quite
different from judicial efficiency. It might
indeed be more efficient to conduct separate
adjudications, each with fewer parties. Reality
tells us, however, that in a state with vast amounts
of arid desert land, and with insufficient water
to provide all inhabitants with all that they need
— let alone desire — the allocation of water to
one claimant, asserting rights to a stream that is
a tributary to another, will inevitably result in a
smaller allocation to another claimant to either
the tributary or the main stream.32

The court also recognized that no general
adjudication could be effective “if federal water
claims, especially those of the Indians, [were]
excluded from the proceeding.”33
The United States Congress made federal
participation in certain water rights litigation
mandatory through the adoption of the McCarran
Amendment.34 This statute provides that “[c]onsent
is given to join the United States as a defendant in
any suit (1) for the adjudication of rights to the use
of water of a river system or other source.” The
Arizona Legislature authorized the institution and
conduct of a general adjudication to determine “the
nature, extent and relative priority of the water rights
UCOWR
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of all persons in the river system and source.”35 In
compliance with the requirements of the McCarran
Amendment, Arizona Revised Statutes § 45251(7) decrees and required “that when rights to
the use of water or dates of appropriation have
previously been determined in a prior decree of
a court, the court shall accept the determination
of such rights and dates of appropriation as found
in the prior decree unless such rights have been
abandoned.”36
In 1976, the Gila River Indian Community
filed claims to have its water rights quantified
under the Winters doctrine, the prior appropriation
doctrine, and the aboriginal rights doctrine. The
Community filed claims for 1,500,000 acre-feet
of water to be used on the 370,000+ acres of land
within the Gila River Indian Reservation (GRIR).
The United States, as trustee for the Gila River
Indian Community, also filed claims for 1,500,000
acre-feet of water.
The progress in the Gila River Adjudication
has been glacial. While settlements of water
rights claims have been presented to and approved
by the trial court, not one contested claim has
been adjudicated since 1974. The trial court has
rendered decisions on a multitude of issues that have
significant, widespread applicability to all parties in
the adjudication — including procedural processes,
Winters claims and subflow.
Gila I dealt with a plethora of procedural
issues. Three of the interlocutory appeals
before the Arizona Supreme Court dealt with
subflow and percolating water: In re General
Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the
Gila River System and Source (Gila II),37 In re
General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water
in the Gila River System and Source (Gila III),38
and In re General Adjudication of All Rights to
Use Water in the Gila River System and Source
(Gila IV).39
In Gila III, the Arizona Supreme Court determined
that, while the subflow/ percolating water bifurcated
system could limit the enforcement rights of state
prior appropriation claims, the doctrine does not
limit the enforcement of Winters rights. Recognizing
that “the notion of subflow is an artifice,”40 the Gila
III Court determined that the arbitrary definitions a
state gives to water, based upon its location, could
not restrict the water rights of an Indian or federal
reservation.
UCOWR

[I]f the United States implicitly intended, when
it established reservations, to reserve sufficient
unappropriated water to meet the reservations’
needs, it must have intended that reservation of
water to come from whatever particular sources
each reservation had at hand. The significant
question for the purpose of the reserved rights
doctrine is not whether the water runs above or
below the ground but whether it is necessary to
accomplish the purpose of the reservation.41

In Southwest Cotton, the Arizona Supreme Court
provided the standard by which to determine whether
underground water was subflow or percolating: “Does
drawing off the subsurface water tend to diminish
appreciably and directly the flow of the surface
stream?”42 Unfortunately, the court did not give the
means by which anybody could apply that standard.
Determining whether underground water was subflow
or percolating went unresolved for decades.
The advent of Arizona’s two general stream
adjudications (in addition to the Gila River
Adjudication, the state is adjudicating the Little
Colorado River) brought this issue to a head. In
1987, the trial court determined that the test for
subflow was whether a well’s pumping for ninety
days would deplete the stream flow by 50% of the
amount of water pumped. Gila II unceremoniously
rejected this test as arbitrary and remanded the
matter with a directive to try again. Gila II told the
trial court to consider criteria such as flow direction,
water level elevation, the gradation of water levels
over a stream reach, the chemical composition and
the lack of hydraulic pressure from tributary aquifer
and basin fill recharge.
On remand, the trial court held a ten- day hearing
and considered the criteria set out by Gila II. The
trial court provided a workable and reasonably
accurate definition of the subflow zone — the
saturated floodplain Holocene alluvium.43 In simple
terms, the flood- plain Holocene alluvium is the area
adjacent to a river that has been flooded and washed
over approximately the last ten thousand years.
The constant washing process has removed the fine
particles, leaving coarse sand and gravel. Water flows
more easily through these loose soils than it does
through the cemented soils of the older alluvium.
Finding that “the ruling comports with hydrological
reality as it is currently understood,” Gila IV affirmed
“the trial court’s order in its entirety.”44
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While the interlocutory appeals were winding
their way through the Arizona Supreme Court, the
trial court attempted to make progress. The trial
court observed that the Winters rights claims of the
United States and the various Indian tribes were
generally very senior based on their creation dates.
Reasoning that it made sense to resolve the impact
of these early, potentially large water rights before
proceeding on to smaller, junior water rights claims,
the trial court decided to begin processing federal
and Indian reservation claims. The Gila River
Indian Community volunteered to have its water
rights claims adjudicated first.
The trial court identified two initial issues it
wanted resolved before taking evidence on the
relative priority and water duty for each acre of
GRIR land with water rights claims. One issue was
whether there were any prior decrees or agreements
that limited the water rights claims for GRIR or
restricted the ability of the Community or the United
States to advance those claims. This process resulted
in seven motions for summary judgment, claiming
that there were fifteen decrees or agreements that
limited water rights for GRIR.
Summary judgment was denied on thirteen of the
fifteen decrees and agreements. Summary judgment
was granted on the claim that the Indian Claims
Commission Decision in Docket 236-D, deciding that
the Community was not entitled to damages for loss
of water from the Salt River prior to 1949, precluded
the Community and the United States from making
Winters claims to the surface flow of the Salt River.
Summary judgment was also granted on the claim that
the Globe Equity Decree precluded the Community
from seeking additional water for the 50,000 acres of
land in the San Carlos Indian Irrigation Project. The
court denied the claim that the Globe Equity Decree
precluded the Community from making claims against
any parties (other than those in Globe Equity) for the
remaining 320,000 acres of land in GRIR. Both of
those decisions are currently on interlocutory appeal
before the Arizona Supreme Court.
The second process the trial court authorized,
with regard to the Community’s and United States’
claims for water rights for GRIR, was an analysis
of the “purpose” for the creation and subsequent
expansions of the Gila River Indian Reservation.
The Community’s opponents argued that various
expansions of GRIR were solely for the purpose of
grazing or were only intended to provide a buffer
Journal of Contemporary Water Research & Education
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between the Pima-Maricopa Indians and non-Indians
and, therefore, the Community was entitled to
minimal or no water for the lands contained in those
expansions. This process was rendered moot by In
re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water
in the Gila River System and Source (Gila V).45
In United States v. New Mexico,46 the United
States Supreme Court determined that the Winters
doctrine only reserved water for the “primary
purpose” of a federal reservation and that, if a federal
reservation needed water for a secondary purpose,
it had to acquire a water right pursuant to state law.
In Gila V, the Arizona Supreme Court determined
that Indian reservations, unlike federal reservations,
were not subject to a primary vs. secondary purpose
test. “Indian reservations, however, are different.
In its role as trustee of such lands, the government
must act on the Indians’ benefit. . . . The purposes
of Indian reserved rights . . . are given broader
interpretation in order to further the federal goal of
Indian self-sufficiency.”47 Gila V determined that
the purpose for the creation of Indian reservations
was to serve “as a ‘permanent home and abiding
place’ for the Indian people as explained in Winters.
. . . Such a construction is necessary for the tribes to
achieve the twin goals of Indian self-determination
and economic self-sufficiency.”48
Gila V rejected “practicably irrigable acreage”
as the sole standard by which Indian reservation
Winters rights would be measured. The court
recognized that Indian tribes and communities would
use their Winters waters for agricultural production,
commercial development, industrial, residential,
and recreational uses, as well as cultural purposes,
natural resource development, and wilderness.
Gila V listed a number of non-exclusive factors to
be considered in quantifying the water rights for
an Indian reservation, including a tribe’s history
and culture, the lands’ geography, topography, and
natural resources, the tribe’s economic base, past
water use, and present and projected population.49
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Gila
V, the trial court discontinued the process leading to
a determination of the “purpose” for the Gila River
Indian Reservation. Recognizing the significant
progress that was being made to resolve the Gila
River Indian Community’s water rights claims, the
trial court stayed the prosecution of the Community’s
claims in order to move on to other issues that were
less likely to be resolved without trials.
UCOWR

40

Lewis and Hestand

GRIC Water Rights Settlement Process
The Community followed a two-track process
in dealing with its water rights claims — vigorous
litigation and resolute negotiation. From the
beginning, the Community realized that it would not
be able to achieve a fair and reasonable settlement
if it could not convince the opposing parties that its
Winters, prior appropriation, and aboriginal water
rights claims were real and substantial threats to
their water supplies. No one was going to negotiate
a settlement that provided the Community with
enough water to meet the needs of its members, and
enough money to build the superstructure necessary
to deliver and use the water, unless the Community
could establish that it had a legitimate chance of
winning an even greater water supply through the
Gila River Adjudication.
The Community also recognized that it would
have to be able to establish a defensible water budget
and to demonstrate that it could and would use the
water that was received through settlement. To that
end, in 1985, the Community developed a Master
Plan. The Master Plan set out how the Community
intended to use the water, deliver the water, pay for
the delivery system (including its future operation
and maintenance costs), and the economic return
the Community expected from its water resources.
Over the past two decades, the Community
has spent incalculable hours meeting with
representatives of major water users — cities,
counties, the State of Arizona, mines, irrigation
districts, power companies, water companies, a
host of federal agencies, and other Indian tribes
— working to develop the Gila River Indian
Community Settlement Agreement. The process
involved determining and agreeing to:
• the water supplies to be used to meet the 653,500
acre-foot water budget;
• the sources of funding to pay for the construction,
operation, and maintenance cost of acquiring and
delivering the Community’s water;
• the changes other parties throughout the State
would make in their water use to protect the
Community’s water supply; and
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• the conditions upon which the Community would
grant waivers to other water users — thereby
giving up the Community’s litigation efforts
against those settling parties.
It is difficult to describe the complexity of
negotiating with scores of large water users, who
often had conflicting needs and wishes. Often,
the Community had to mediate disputes between
other water users in order to get agreement on
the Community’s settlement needs. Even after
substantive issues were resolved, countless
hours were spent on the precise wording and
punctuation of each paragraph. All parties were
legitimately concerned about the possibility of
unclear or ambiguous language that would cause
real problems in the future.
The Community, and its multitude of associate
negotiators, finally produced a 320- page settlement
agreement with 75 exhibits and numerous attachments
to those exhibits that resolved most of the issues
between most of the parties. The Community and
its throng of fellow travelers then negotiated and
drafted a 266 page bill that was introduced in the
Senate and House of Representatives. Following
numerous hearings and amendments, the bill was
passed and signed into law by President Bush on
December 10, 2004.
Thereafter, the Community and the other
interested parties negotiated and drafted legislation
to be introduced into the Arizona Legislature to
implement the various provisions necessary to
protect the Community’s water supplies, including
limitations on ground water pumping in the areas
adjoining the Gila River Indian Reservation and
restrictions on further agricultural development
on the Gila River and its tributaries upstream of
Ashurst-Hayden Diversion Dam.
Having accomplished these enormous tasks,
the Community has a vast array of activities still
to accomplish before its settlement becomes
official. Some issues in the settlement agreement
have not been completely finalized, and some of
the major participants in the process have not yet
signed onto the agreement. There are some of
these parties whose involvement is not crucial to
the implementation of the settlement. However,
resolution of their claims would greatly benefit the
Community and those who have settled with the
Community. Those negotiations continue.
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The Community is currently reviewing the
settlement agreement with various parties and
making changes that are required to conform to the
provisions in the settlement legislation. Following
final completion of this process, the settlement
agreement will be presented to the Secretary of
the Interior for formal federal approval. The
Community must obtain environmental clearances
from the appropriate federal agencies for the various
construction activity that will accompany delivery
of the Community’s settlement water. Finally, the
Community and its new-found allies will present
the Gila River Indian Community Settlement
Agreement to the Gila River Adjudication Court
for its review and approval. Parties who object to
the settlement agreement may, at that time, express
their objections.

Degree in 1962 from Trinity University, San Antonio, Texas;
Master of Arts in History, Arizona State University in 1972; and
his Juris Doctor Degree from the School of Law, University of
California, Los Angeles in 1972.

Conclusion

2. Adams v. Salt River Valley Water Users’ Ass’n, 80 P.2d
1060, 1066 (Ariz. 1939).

For over a century, the Gila River Indian
Community has been striving to regain the use of
water that was taken from it by upstream diversions.
For the past thirty years, the Community has fought
for its federal and state water rights in the arena of
the Gila River Adjudication and the Globe Equity
Decree. Ultimately, a negotiated settlement was
developed and water rights and claims were finally
settled. For the past twenty years, the Community
has been in full-time discussions, seeking to
negotiate a resolution of its water rights claims
that would provide the Community with the water
necessary for its future survival, while providing
the non-Indian parties with the certainty that they
can divide the water that remains among them. The
process has been long and painful, but the end is in
sight. The Community looks forward to the day
when water again flows plentifully in its irrigation
ditches and some of the natural habitat on the Gila
River Indian Reservation is re-established.

3. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 45-141(A) (2005).
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